Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Xorošij argument i èpistemičeskij reljativizm
Alexei Chernyak
Department of Humanitarian and Social Science of Russian, University of Friendship of Nations
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 33)

What is an epistemically good argument? There is an important and widely recognized distinction between an argument and an argumentation; and there is a fact that logically correct argument may have different values in argumentation corresponding to its persuasiveness or capacity to provide beliefs, or convey consensus, or some other presumably relevant types of results. Does it have different epistemic value in such contexts as well? Epistemic value in turn tends to be constructed in various manners according to the background social epistemology. How relativistic the idea of epistemically good argument might be after all? These are the questions addressed by this paper.

good argument, social epistemology, knowledge, justification, argumentation, relativism

Alston W.P. A Doxastic Practice Approach to Epistemology P. K. Moser (ed.), Empirical Knowledge. Totowa, 1996.

Aristotel', Sočinenija. T 2. MOSCOW, 1978.

Cook R., A Dictionary of Philosophical Logic. Edinburgh, 2009.

Craig E. Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford, 1990.

Dekart R. Pravila dlja rukovodstva uma, Dekart, Sočinenija v 2-x tomax T. 1. MOSCOW, 1989.

Feldman R. Good Arguments F. Schmitt (ed.), Socializing Epistemology. Lanham, 1994.

Gerasimova I. A. Fenomen argumentacii Èpistemologija i filosofija nauki. 2009. T. XXI, № 3.

 Goldman A. Knowledge in a Social World, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999, 134f, а также Goldman A. "Argumentation and Social Epistemology", Journal of Philosophy, 91, 1994.

Govier T. What is a Good Argument? Metaphilosophy. 1992.

Grajs G.P. Logika i rečevoe obščenie Novoe v zarubežnoj lingvistike. Vypusk XVI. Lingvističeskaja pragmatika. MOSCOW, 1985.

Kitcher, P. The Advancement of Science, Oxford, 1993.

Koèn MOSCOW, Nagel' È. Vvedenie v logiku i naučnyj metod. MOSCOW, 2010.

Nozick R. Philosophical Explanations. Oxford, 1981.

Peirce C.S. The Fixation of Belief Popular Science Monthly. 1877.

Toulmin S.E. The Uses of Argument. Cambridge, 1958.

Xomenko I.V. "Neformal'nye issledovanija v teorii argumentacii: problema klassifikacii" Modeli rassuždenij 2: argumentacija i racional'nost'. Kaliningrad, 2008.

Full Text: