HUME’S ‘SCEPTICISM’ ABOUT INDUCTION

Publication Type:

Language:

Transliteration of original Title: 
"Skepticizm" Juma v otnošenii indukcii
Author(s): 
Peter Millican
University of Oxford
Issue number: 
No. 4 (Vol. 34)
Pages: 
18-41
Abstract: 

The paper focuses on the essential problem of Hume’s philosophy – his treatment of induction. The author suggests that in spite of his famous “skeptical” arguments against the method of induction, Hume could be considered as the advocate of its scientific use throughout all his work. To provide a solution to this difficulty, Millican scrutinizes in detail Hume’s “Chief argument”, with the intent of showing that the “inference from the past” is not justified by any of the human cognitive abilities. However, Millican believes, Hume’s real aim was not to discredit human cognitive powers but rather to show experimentally the mechanism of inductive reasoning. The targets of his skeptical argumentation were the traditional concepts of “evidential connections” and not the very ability of induction.

Keywords: 
David Hume, induction, scepticism, naturalism, theory of ideas, uniformity principle
References: 

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