SOME DEONTIC LOGICAL FORMULAE THAT CAN BE USED IN A NATURAL WAY IN HUMAN REASONING

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Author(s): 
Miguel López-Astorga
Humanísticos “Juan Ignacio Molina”, University of Talca
Issue number: 
No.4 (Vol.54)
Pages: 
111-122
Abstract: 

The mental models theory proposes that reasoning is not logical. From its point of view, people only regard possibilities that represent reality in an iconic way, and they draw conclusions by reviewing such possibilities. Obviously, a framework of this kind seems incompatible with the idea that the human mind thinks by means of logical forms. However, in this paper, the author tries to show that, if we accept the basic theses of the mental models theory, we must also assume that certain formal logical structures are equally part of the human intellectual machinery, even though its proponents explicitly reject any link between logic and thought. In particular, the author argues here that it is not possible to adopt the mental models theory without accepting, at the same time, some deontic propositions that are usually admitted in standard deontic logic.

Keywords: 
deontic logic, iconic possibilities, logical form, mental models, reasoning
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DOI: 
10.5840/eps201754476
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