Testimony and the transmission of religious knowledge

Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Svidetel'stvo i peredacha religioznogo znaniya
John Greco
Saint Louis University
Issue number: 
no.3 (vol.53)

This paper advocates for a “social turn” in religious epistemology.  Part One reviews some familiar skeptical arguments targeting religious belief (the argument from luck, the argument from peer disagreement, Hume’s argument). All these skeptical arguments say that testimonial evidence cannot give religious belief adequate support or grounding, especially in the context of conflicting evidence. Part Two considers some recent work in social epistemology and the epistemology of testimony. Several issues regarding the nature of testimonial evidence are considered, and an account of testimonial evidence as a means of distribution of information through the system is defended. Part Three uses the results of Part Two to reconsider the skeptical arguments in Part One.

religious epistemology, religious belief, social epistemology, testimony

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