On the sociocultural body of knowledge. Aspects of a phenomenological approach to the social philosophy of science

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Walter Schweidler
Katholische Universität Eichstätt-Ingolstadt
Issue number: 
No.1 (Vol.51)

The author defends the anti-representationalist claim that the formation of the proper names (and as a consequence – scientific terms or notions) cannot happen through certain ostensive pointing at some objects given here and now (like in B. Russell’s theory ) or through perceptions which are generalized inductively or by means of Kantian apperception or Anschauung. In order to answer the question about the concepts formation we have to take into account the historical and socio-cultural background of the genesis of proper names which form the foundation and boundary of all classifications including the scientific ones. The author claims that there is an important difference between a personal belief or propositional knowledge and some implicit or background knowledge of the language community in its historical development. The first one could be evaluated on its truth /falseness. The second one however – being the foundation for the first one – cannot be evaluated in this manner. It simply is as it is. 

anti-representationism, proper names, language community, knowledge

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