The third reading: a cluster analysis

Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Tret'e prochtenie: klasternyy analiz
Alexey Cherniak
People's Friendship University of Russia
Issue number: 
No.4 (Vol.50)

This issue is dedicated to the analysis of sentences which purpose is to describe someone's psychological attitudes in terms of a corresponding but different attitudes of agents of describing reports, and which understanding produces so called "scope paradox". Normally any sentence which describes someone's attitude with propositional content has two readings: according to one of them the expression of how an agent of the report view the described attitude is placed outside of the scope of an attitude operator; according to another it is placed within that scope. But sometimes intuition says that neither reading would properly represent what is being said in the report. In order to solve the problem which such cases seem to generate the idea of a third reading was proposed. But perhaps we still don't need third reading in order to express proper understanding of such difficult cases; in what follows it will be shown for the sake of this hypotheses that if the sentences in question are analyzed as clusters of reports all we need are two standard readings.

meaning, truth conditions, propositional attitude, semantics, logical analysis, third reading, scope paradox, cluster

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