Thought experiment and logic

Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Myslennyy eksperiment i logika
irina Griftsova
Moscow State Pedagogical University
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 49)

This paper considers the article by V.P. Filatov from the perspective of the role played by logic in a thought experiment. It is shown that this role depends on the way reasoning ant its correlation with logical inference are interpreted. It is suggested to view a model developed within informal logic as the most relevant to the role V.P. Filatov assigns to a thought experiment (turning the layer of implicit knowledge into explicit).

thought experiment, reasoning, logical inference, informal logic

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