INDETERMINISTIC MODEL OF CAUSATION IN LIBERTARIAN ACCOUNTS OF FREE WILL

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Transliteration of original Title: 
Indeterministicheskie modeli kauzal'nosti v libertarianskikh teoriyakh svobody voli
Author(s): 
Alexander Mishura
National Research University Higher School of Economics
Issue number: 
No. 1 (Vol. 43)
Pages: 
190-206
Abstract: 

This paper is devoted to the analysis of indeterministic models of causation in the analytic philosophy of action. At the beginning of this article, I deal with the most common in contemporary debates indeterministic theories authored by Robert Kane, Daniel Dennett, Alfred Mele and Laura Ekstrom. After critical examination of given theories and finding what in my opinion is their main difficulty I provide an alternative account of action. The approach seeks to integrate rationality inside the action itself and not on the specific causal chain preceding it as it became common since famous article of Donald Davidson “Actions, reasons and causes”. I propose to consider action as onotological entity consisting of three parts: 1) goal; 2) mean(s) to achieve goal; 3) teleological relation “for” between 1 and 2. Therefore, “Jim moved his arm to take a cup of tea” has 3 parts 1) taking a cup of teal; 2) Moving Jim’s arm; 3) “for” between 1 and 2. This account of rational action as I expect would escape some long-living paradoxes of causal theory of action. Finally I provide the concept of non-phenomenal will trying to explain some further properties of agency such as its “active” character and to close an explanatory gap between merely thinking about doing something and actually doing. This non-phenomenal will nevertheless is not meant as something necessarily transcendent and extra-natural, on the contrary it could match naturalistic point of view provided by neuroscience.

Keywords: 
action, indeterminism, libertarianism, free will, causation, causal theory of action
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DOI: 
10.5840/eps201543140
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