Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Iskustvenniy intellekt i (post)strukturnaya semantika
Diana Gasparyan
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Department of Philosophy
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 41)

There are two problem areas associated with modern studies of philosophy of mind focusing on identification and convergence of human and machine intelligence. One problem is machine simulation of meaning and the other – machine simulation of sense. In the present study the analysis of the stated problems is carried out based on the concepts of structural and post-structural linguistics almost entirely ignored by philosophy of mind. If we refer to the basic definitions of “sign” and “meaning” found in structuralism and post-structuralism, we will see a fundamental difference between the capabilities of a machine and the human brain engaged in processing of a sign. The present study will exemplify and provide more and probably stronger evidence to support distinction between syntactic and semantic aspects of intelligence, the issue widely discussed by adepts of contemporary philosophy of mind.

Artificial Intelligence, Strong Artificial Intelligence, Weak Artificial Intelligence, Meaning, Sense, Reference, Semantics, Syntaxes, Structural Semantics, (Post)-Structural Semantics, Narrative.

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