SEMANTIC PROCESS OF CONSCIOUSNESS: FROM COMPUTATIONAL MODELS TO LINGUISTIC EXPERIENCE

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Transliteration of original Title: 
Semanticheskie processy soznaniya: ot vychislitel’nyh modeley k yazikovomu opytu
Author(s): 
Pavel Baryshnikov
Pyatigorsk State Linguistic University
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 41)
Pages: 
96-114
Abstract: 

This article looks to consider the principles of generation of the conceptual and semantic relations in the conscious experience and in the computational process of modern artificial intellectual systems. We attempt to give proof of the unformalizability of qualitative states and we mean to clarify the semantic differences between information and meaning. It’s important to describe the role of the language system in the cognitive and semantic procedures of consciousness including the computational aspect of problem. The consistent intellectual activity (in engineering approach) requires the particular material organization of processing and the rules of logical-semantic inference. The semantics of mental states demands uncertain, undefined conclusions and the agent capable of free will. Computational Theory of Mind and computer-based information system models can clearly present the cognitive process but without any explanation of substantial nature of linguistic components of consciousness. In this paper the following points are: in the human cognitive process there are some elements which are not accessible for formalization and computer modeling. One of these components is natural language fuzzy semantics. This feature of natural language is related to the private mental states and to the uniqueness of associative activity of consciousness. The stable meanings of language system are representable in the data machine forms but the pragmatic functions require the experience of conscious existence. Artificial intelligence is connected with neither world of things nor mental representations but only with information and inference rules. The natural language semantics establishes the symbolic relations between the consciousness and the entire being.

Keywords: 
Computational Theory of Mind, computability, qualia, conceptualization, knowledge representation.
References: 

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