Publication Type:


Tian Yu Cao
Department of Philosophy, Boston University
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 41)

Various theories of referent are critically but briefly surveyed from the perspective of structural realism; a constructivist version of structural realist account of referent is outlined, and its implications for history of science and for descriptive metaphysics are briefly indicated.

reference, realism, constructivism, history of science, metaphysics.

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