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Transliteration of original Title: 
Soznanie: meždu Xigginsom i Frankenštejnom
Ilya Kasavin
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Issue number: 
No. 1 (Vol. 31)

Today many philosophers and psychologists refuse to limit themselves with a purely ontological concept of consciousness and supplement it with an epistemological one. We are learning consciousness, seemingly, in the most immediate and credible manner, through self-perception, but such knowledge lacks intersubjectivity. And at the same time, we are learning consciousness indirectly and intersubjectively, watching the behavior of other people, but this knowledge is only an approximate and probable one. There are also other issues related to the role of consciousness in the process of cognition. Can I keep learning for adaptation in natural surroundings, as believed by evolutionary epistemologists? Or factor of self-awareness and reflection is essential for knowledge? Finally, whether the consideration of consciousness out of the process of learning throughout justified, as is often the case in the discussions on the "mind-body" problem? And yet is there anything in the mind that is not knowledge? Can consciousness be reduced to the corporal processes? Do qualia represent knowledge or merely an epiphenomenon of brain activity? 

Mind, consciousness, knowledge, cognition, qualia, mental states, reductionism, behaviorism, mentalism, idealism, dualism, materialism

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