Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
Deflyatsionistskiy podkhod k gruppovomu soobshcheniyu
Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University
Issue number: 
No. 2 (Vol. 36)

How should we understand group testimony as a source of knowledge? According to a reductionist account, a group’s testimony that p is epistemologically reducible to the testimony of some individual(s). In contrast, a non-reductionist account of these phenomena maintains that in some very important sense, the group itself is the bearer of the state. In this paper, I raise problems for both views and then develop my own deflationary account, according to which the epistemic status of a group’s testimony is reducible to that of one or more individuals, though not necessarily ones who are members of the group in question.

testimony, knowledge, reductionism, non-reductionism, deflationism

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