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Transliteration of original Title: 
Nekotorye sluchai netranzitivnosti v obosnovannyx suzhdeniyakh ob identichnosti
Constantine Frolov
St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy of Science and Technology, assistant researcher.
Issue number: 
No. 2 (Vol. 40)

This article analyzes various mechanisms involved in the genesis of such sequences of reports as: «S believes, that A is identical to B; S believes, B is identical with C, but S believes, that it is not true, that A is identical with C». In particular, our interest will focus on those cases when all elementary judgments in this structure (including the latter one) are independently justified by personal sensual experience of the subject, her direct «acquaintance» with the state of affairs. In such circumstances, these judgments can not be called totally wrong or mistaken. Moreover, in some considered cases these structures are not just possible, but fundamentally indispensable. Reasons of genesis of such situations differ depending on what we mean by A, B and C (properties of phenomena, properties of objects or objects themselves), or depending on the role that natural language (with its limited vocabulary and vague applicability of concepts) plays in these mechanisms. First part is dedicated to cases of non-transitivity in judgments about sameness of phenomena (colors, pitches of sounds, etc.). Inter alia, here we discuss well-known problem of phenomenal sorites and suggest some of arguments for the possibility of their existence. But in the base of there existence there is a serious problem of comparison of the same phenomena taken from different contexts. The second part is about cases when we deal with primary qualities of physical objects (height, volume, etc.). And the third part considers cases when we make some judgments about sameness of objects themselves (for example, objects which are continuously changing during the time and becoming something different). The main thesis is that our perceptions, as opposed to correct thinking, do not always match rigorous standards of classical logic, and sometimes they are able to come into conflict.

Identity, sameness, transitivity, belief, justification.

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