PROPER BELIEFS AND QUASI-BELIEFS

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Author(s): 
Carlos J. Moya
University of Valencia
Tobies Grimaltos
University of Valencia
Issue number: 
No. 4 (Vol. 38)
Pages: 
14-26
Abstract: 

In this paper, we distinguish two ways in which someone can be said to believe a proposition. In the light of this distinction, we question the widely held equivalence between considering a proposition true and believing that proposition. In some cases, someone can consider a proposition true and not properly believe it. This leads to a distinction between the conventional meaning of the sentence by which a subject expresses a belief and the content of this belief. We also question some principles of belief ascription, suggest a solution to a famous puzzle about belief and defend the unity of the semantic and causal aspects of beliefs.

Keywords: 
Belief content, Truth conditions, Belief ascription, Definite descriptions, Kripke’s puzzle
References: 

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