HUME AND DAVIDSON: PASSION, EVALUATION, AND TRUTH

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Transliteration of original Title: 
Yum i Devidson: affekt, otsenka i istinnost'
Author(s): 
John Bricke
The University of Kansas
Issue number: 
No. 1 (Vol. 35)
Pages: 
35-54
Abstract: 

The paper pursues the question whether what might be called an ‘attenuated cognitivist’ account of evaluative language (sometimes associated with D.Davidson) might be joined to an essentially Humean conativist-cum-affectivist account of moral evaluation, one taking the conative as central. Thus the paper reflects on central aspects of Hume’s moral psychology and metaethics through a Davidsonian lens, by exploring several dimensions of D.Davidson’s broad philosophical project concerning mind and language (including Davidson’s views on reasons for action, his account of radical interpretation, and the so-called Unified Theory of Meaning and Action).

Keywords: 
Hume, Davidson, conativism, cognitivism, metaethics
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