SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE: THE PROBLEM OF EPISTEMIC TESTIMONY

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Transliteration of original Title: 
Istochniki znaniya: problema «testimonial knowledge»
Author(s): 
Ilya Kasavin
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Issue number: 
No. 1 (Vol. 35)
Pages: 
5-15
Abstract: 

Classical epistemology draws a sharp difference between the production and the distribution of knowledge. In the first case we deal with a new knowledge obtained by perceiving individual (generative knowledge), in the second – with a circulation of existing knowledge in society (transmissive knowledge). Not long ago, analytical philosophers have concluded that such a demarcation of generative and transmissive knowledge is burdened with serious problems. Many of them try to prove that the knowledge obtained as a result of the communication (testimony knowledge), has not the worst, and perhaps even more fundamental epistemic status. Did they gain here some new knowledge or just remembered something which has been already known earlier? The cognitive significance of communication though seems evident needs new arguments proving its irreducibility to the sense experience of a person, an independent content in terms of justification and credulity.

Keywords: 
epistemology, knowledge, testimony, communication, analytic philosophy
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