Publication Type:


Transliteration of original Title: 
«Traktat» Vitgenshteyna: vyskazyvanie i pokazyvanie
Anastasiya Belyaeva
Pirogov Russian National Research Medical University
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 37)

The paper focuses on saying/showing distinction in Wittgenstein’s «Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus». The purpose is to discuss what grounds and consequences this distinction has. The author starts with a brief review of two opposing views on the Tractatus, which sets the context of any discussion on the Tractatus. Then she examined the meaning of saying/showing distinction, and divide what can be said from what can be shown. The author then considers the most important characteristic of showing, and what conditions must be met for showing to be possible, more precisely, how language should be arranged in order to showing become possible. The author examines what will happen if the conditions which made showing possible are violated. Finally, the author tries to consider a strong objection to her argument, and decides which one of the two opposing views on the Tractatus is more reasonable.

Tractatus, saying vs showing, history of philosophy

Black M., A Companion to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Cornell UP, 1964); G.E.M. Anscombe, An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (London: Hutchinson, 1971);

Conant J. ‘Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein and Nonsense’, in T. Cohen et al. (eds), Pursuits of Reason (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1993), pp. 195–224;

Conant J. ‘Must We Show What We Cannot Say?’. R. Flemming and M. Payne (eds) The Senses of Stanley Cavell (Bucknell UP, 1989), pp. 242–83.

Conant J. ‘The Method of the Tractatus’, in E.H. Reck (ed.), From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytical Philosophy (Oxford UP, forthcoming).

Conant J. ‘The Search for Logically Alien Thought: Descartes, Kant, Frege and the Tractatus’, Philosophical Topics, 20 (1991), pp. 115–80.

Diamond C. ‘Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the Tractatus’, in The Realistic Spirit (MIT Press, 1995), pp. 179–204.

Diamond C., ‘Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, in R. Heinrich and H. Vetter (eds), Bilder der Philosophie, Wiener Reihe, 5 (1991), pp. 55–90.

Goldfarb W., ‘Metaphysics and Nonsense: on Cora Diamond’s The Realistic Spirit’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 22 (1997), pp. 57–73.

Hacker P. M. S., Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), and Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

Harward, Donald W. Wittgenstein’s Saying and Showing Themes. Bonn: Bouvier, 1976.

Malcolm N., Nothing is Hidden: Wittgenstein’s Criticism of his Early Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); D. Pears, The False Prison: a Study in the Development of Wittgenstein’s Philosophy, Vol. I (Oxford UP, 1987).

McDonough, Richard M. The Argument of the Tractatus. Albany: SUNY Press, 1986.

Ramsey F., ‘Critical Notice of L. Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ in Foundations of Mathematics (London: Routledge, 1931), pp. 270–86.

Ricketts T., ‘Pictures, Logic, and the Limits of Sense in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus’, in H. Sluga and D. Stern (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge UP, 1996), pp. 59–99.

Russell B., Preface to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971), pp. ix–xxii.

Witgenshtein L. Logiko-filosofskiy traktat (Tractatus logico-philosophicus). Moscow, Nauka, 1958.

Full Text: