PERSONAL IDENTITY AS A FACT OF ONTOLOGY. AN OBJECTION TO DEREK PARFIT

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Transliteration of original Title: 
Tozhdestvo lichnosti kak ontologicheskiy fakt: vozrazhenie Dereku Parfitu
Author(s): 
Maria Sekatskaya
Department of Philosophy, Saint Petersburg State University
Issue number: 
No. 3 (Vol. 37)
Pages: 
76-84
Abstract: 

The article aims to show that if we take the thesis of minimal supervenience to be true then Derek Parfit’s arguments against ontological approach to personal identity are not sufficient to prove that ontological criterion of personal identity should be abandoned. We will also try to show that Parfit’s arguments in favor of using “what matters” considerations for deciding whether a given person survives can not be seen as arguments for or against ontological criterion of personal identity.

Keywords: 
Derek Parfit, personal identity, ontology of persons, supervenience, survival
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